Brihard said:
To further muddy the waters, the growth of CSOR has led directly to the creation of a new trade in the CAF: Special Forces Operator.
When we thinkf of 'Special Operations Forces", we often think of the Tier 1 units - SAS, JTF-2, Delta, SEALs, etc. The guys we think of as the 'doorkickers' who excel in extremely precise and generally quite small and distinct missions- go rescue those hostages; go find and destroy those SCUDs. Go. Shoot this bad guy in the face a couple times. "Special forces" in the US context, which CSOR seems to be mirroring to an extent, still has a definite direct action combat capability, but also trains for and is employed in missions like helping develop and train foreign militaries or paramilitary police for counterinsurgency ops, PSYOPS stuff, etc, working with local militias/tribal groups in insurgency operations, etc. Lots of overlapping stuff, but still some distinctions in the 'flavour' of what they do.
It really does get murky.
The US Green Beret Special Forces were never designed to be direct action types (although it is one of the capabilities in their repertoire.) Their entire organizational structure (ODAs, ODBs and ODCs - detachment, company and battalion respectively) were designed to be the adviser core elements of larger foreign formations (company, battalion, brigade/regiment respectively)
Neither were they designed as the combat enablers to support Tier 1 forces which is the role that went towards the 75th Ranger Regiment.
In Afghanistan however the Green Berets core tasks slipped from their traditional unconventional warfare and foreign internal defence to direct action roles often with Afghan partner units. The training of the Afghan National Army, rather then being SF tasks, became the role of the various mentoring teams under Op Phoenix (primarily under the command and manned by rotating National Guard Divisions)
Similarly, in Afghanistan and Iraq, as commanders started to reach down and touch not just high value terrorist targets but also mid value and low value ones, they needed more manpower and the Ranger Regiment started deploying platoons etc independent of Tier 1 operators on direct action missions.
The big difference was that the Green Berets remained an asset of the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Forces (both CJSOTF-Iraq and CJSOTF-Afghanistan) while the Rangers as well as the Tier 1 operators reported to Joint Special Operations Command even though they did missions throughout the same areas of operations. (Don't even get me started at the roles of allied special ops forces and the much later ISAF special ops HQ)
Anyone who would like to work through some of this muddle is encouraged to read A Different Kind of War: The US Army in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM 2001 to 2005 put out by the Combat Studies Institute Press A pdf copy of which can be found at:
http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/csi/docs/DifferentKindofWar.pdf While this publication does not cover the later phases of the Afghan war, it does cover the timeframe within which the system changed as the US thought Afghanistan was pretty much won and changes like the stand up of Combined Joint Task Force PHOENIX and the emphasis by the US shifted towards Iraq.
For anyone more interested in the history etc of JSOC I would strongly recommend Sean Naylor's Relentless Strike: The Secret History of Joint Special Operations Command which can be purchased here:
https://www.amazon.ca/Relentless-Strike-History-Special-Operations/dp/1250014549
:cheers:
