5.84 Our audit examined four urgent vehicle acquisitions for use in Afghanistan. We found that the three vehicles that have been deployed to Afghanistan, according to National Defence, have met operational needs. However, not all the projects have delivered all the required capabilities and National Defence has had to make adjustments.
5.85 Unlike non-urgent acquisitions, the Armoured Patrol Vehicle (RG-31), the Leopard 2 Tank replacement project, and the Armoured Heavy Support Vehicle System (AHSVS) project were procured and delivered quickly and, in the opinion of National Defence, have contributed to the safeguarding of Canadian soldiers in Afghanistan. However, the Light Armoured Vehicle Remote Weapon System (LAV RWS) project is nearly two years behind the original schedule and will cost at least double what the government was first told.
5.86 The two competitive processes that we audited were successful in contracting the needed vehicles in a timely manner and in complying with all rules that apply to contracting. However, we did find some problems with contracting roles and responsibilities, information given to senior officials, and contract administration. Given the urgent operational requirements of National Defence, the problems we saw in the competitive processes were somewhat understandable.
5.87 National Defence should examine its Project Approval Guide to determine how acquisitions can be managed so that urgently needed equipment can be acquired in a timely manner while respecting accepted project management principles. We found that the documentation required for these urgent projects was not produced in a manner that complies with the Department’s own Guide.
5.88 In order to use new equipment, there must be adequate training. In one project, the Department underestimated the need for vehicles that could be used for training. This means that the number of vehicles available for operations will be significantly reduced.
5.89 While our audit found that three projects slipped behind schedule, we recognize that the timelines were ambitious. We found that some projects, such as the RG-31, which was in production, can be quickly delivered to where they are needed. Other projects, such as the LAV RWS that involve development work, require more time to plan. When this need for planning time is not respected, the project may fall short in meeting operational needs and also suffer cost overruns. In our opinion, given the significant development work in the LAV RWS project, it should have been managed more rigorously in accordance with National Defence’s Project Approval Guide.
5.90 It is important that Treasury Board ministers have the information they need to make good decisions. While we found that the Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat exercised its challenge function, we also found that it missed some important issues related to these projects. As well, National Defence did not disclose all relevant information.
