Armoured RECCE

[Spencer100]

Could something like the Cockerill i-X be useful in a Recce Squadron (ideally in conjunction with UGVs, UAVs and the LAV-LRSS)

View attachment 71409

Kind of like a modern Ferret. Also light enough (and air transportable) that it could provide some fire support for light infantry in ISVs when equipped with a 30mm and ATGMs.

Put in on the base of an uparmoured Ford Expedition and you have a urban warrior!

 

[MSmith]

I didn't want to start an entirely new thread, so attached is an article I wrote from my Regiment's experience on Ex MR 21. Its approx 5k words but hopefully addresses the original post of this thread, which asked what Armoured guys think of Vlad Kessia's article. It also assumes that the reader is familiar with the cavalry concept (if not, probably the best place to start is reading First Principles and the Generation of Armoured Fighting Power by now-Major McInnes) The essence is that I'm trying to use a real-world example to show that the cavalry concept is unworkable if not properly resourced. This doesn't mean simply adding a .50 and ATGM to our vehicles as is the current proposal - it means a true combined arms squadron in the vein of American Cavalry.

I should also mention that I appreciate a lot of the earlier posts in this thread and the articles that people have alluded to or shared - I learned a lot and it certainly shaped the article.

This is draft 3 and an earlier version will be appearing in the Armoured Bulletin, but I will be submitting a beefier version to the Army Journal and would appreciate any/all criticism you guys have on it.

 

[daftandbarmy]

I didn't want to start an entirely new thread, so attached is an article I wrote from my Regiment's experience on Ex MR 21. Its approx 5k words but hopefully addresses the original post of this thread, which asked what Armoured guys think of Vlad Kessia's article. It also assumes that the reader is familiar with the cavalry concept (if not, probably the best place to start is reading First Principles and the Generation of Armoured Fighting Power by now-Major McInnes) The essence is that I'm trying to use a real-world example to show that the cavalry concept is unworkable if not properly resourced. This doesn't mean simply adding a .50 and ATGM to our vehicles as is the current proposal - it means a true combined arms squadron in the vein of American Cavalry.

I should also mention that I appreciate a lot of the earlier posts in this thread and the articles that people have alluded to or shared - I learned a lot and it certainly shaped the article.

This is draft 3 and an earlier version will be appearing in the Armoured Bulletin, but I will be submitting a beefier version to the Army Journal and would appreciate any/all criticism you guys have on it.

Really interesting, thanks!

So my take away is that the answer to the Cavalry question, sometimes, is 'Light Infantry', right?

Our solution was to create dismounted AT teams based on 4 pers with Carl G(ustav)s. We had limited access to ATVs and Tac Hel for movement/infiltration and they had a fall back plan to the nearest OP. Their task was to destroy recce and vanguard elements as they advanced towards the main screen line. The enemy had done their estimate and were looking for Coyotes and TAPVs (which were easy to find in that terrain) but were not looking for/could not find small, well placed AT teams. These teams were extremely effective in hitting the enemy before they could be seen and cause attrition, chaos and a lack of SA (situational awareness)/recce for the enemy. These teams were extremely effective, destroying 30+ vehicles throughout the exercise. Since we had limited resources and dismounted teams are slow by their nature, it required detailed terrain analysis to identify the 2 or 3 likely manoeuvre axis which is where we would set up the teams.9

 

[MSmith]

Really interesting, thanks!

So my take away is that the answer to the Cavalry question, sometimes, is 'Light Infantry', right?

It is certainly once piece to the puzzle, the article focussed on a dismounted capability as it is the most glaring omission from the current proposal and sort of the "solution" that the squadron came up with to their problem on MR 21. A dismounted capability is not completely absent, but it proposed by the RCAC as an assault troop held at Regimental level and provided by the reserves. When they will ever have an opportunity to train with the supported Regiment, I am highly dubious, and its supposed to be an assault troop rather than what I envision as being a modern combination previous of support, assault, and pioneer troops (ie, general purpose scouts and able to provide limited mobility support if required).

As I mention thought it's just one piece of resourcing the squadrons to do what they are being asked. Doctrinally you couldn't tell a recce squadron to do much more than SCREEN without significant augmentation by manoeuvre forces - changing the name of the squadron and reorganizing into 4-car troops does nothing to change this.

The other parts of the article are more tangental but should hopefully make clear that organic indirect fires at the sqn level, a more robust anti-armour capability (perhaps even NLOS or loitering munis?), access to mines (both on and off route as tested in the article cited), more robust UAS capability, etc are whats required to have the squadron perform as desired without removing the economy of force element that makes cavalry suitable for reconnaissance, surveillance, screening, etc in the first place (see comments on reconnaissance paradox).

McGrath in "Scouts Out!" would like to see an army that has general purpose manoeuvre forces conducting their own reconnaissance and specialized lighter reconnaissance units disappearing; I think that ignores the reality that resources for the Army is a zero sum game and we cannot afford to have square combat teams doing the job that a real cavalry squadron could.

I agree completely that we had a surplus of bde recce sqns without a bde to employ them, and we should be reforming to something more useful - flicking holy water at them and telling them that they are born again as a tank sqn equivalant is not the answer.

 

[daftandbarmy]

McGrath in "Scouts Out!" would like to see an army that has general purpose manoeuvre forces conducting their own reconnaissance and specialized lighter reconnaissance units disappearing; I think that ignores the reality that resources for the Army is a zero sum game and we cannot afford to have square combat teams doing the job that a real cavalry squadron could.

I agree completely that we had a surplus of bde recce sqns without a bde to employ them, and we should be reforming to something more useful - flicking holy water at them and telling them that they are born again as a tank sqn equivalant is not the answer.

That's likely the key, IMHO, not that I'm an expert in this field. Tasking a LAV/TAPV/Leo 2 bunch with a screening role is likely a non-starter.

In the UK, as I recall, the CVR (T) family of vehicles was designed for a cavalry-type screening role, shooting and scooting around just beyond the FEBA. It included an APC version, the Spartan, that shuttled troops around doing what you mentioned in terms of a dismounted anti-armour role, I believe. I've almost been run over by them, a couple of times, at night on Salisbury Plain but the crews subsequently suggested that they could see us perfectly with their night vis kit. Surrreee they did ....



The Combat Vehicle Reconnaissance (Tracked), abbreviated CVR(T), is a family of armoured fighting vehicles (AFV)s developed in the 1960s and is in service with the British Army and others throughout the world. They are small, highly mobile, air-transportable armoured vehicles, originally designed to replace the Alvis Saladin armoured car.[2]

Designed by Alvis in the 1960s, the CVR(T) family includes Scorpion and Scimitar light reconnaissance tanks, Spartan armoured personnel carriers (APC)s, Sultan command and control vehicle, Samaritan armoured ambulance, Striker anti–tank guided missile vehicle and Samson armoured recovery vehicle. All members of the CVR(T) family were designed to share common automotive components and suspension; aluminium armour was selected to keep the weight down.[3][4] By 1996, more than 3,500 had been built for British Army use and export.[5]

Scorpion and Striker have now been withdrawn from British Army service.

Combat Vehicle Reconnaissance (Tracked) - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

 

[MSmith]

That's likely the key, IMHO, not that I'm an expert in this field. Tasking a LAV/TAPV/Leo 2 bunch with a screening role is likely a non-starter.

In the UK, as I recall, the CVR (T) family of vehicles was designed for a cavalry-type screening role, shooting and scooting around just beyond the FEBA. It included an APC version, the Spartan, that shuttled troops around doing what you mentioned in terms of a dismounted anti-armour role, I believe. I've almost been run over by them, a couple of times, at night on Salisbury Plain but the crews subsequently suggested that they could see us perfectly with their night vis kit. Surrreee they did ....

Exactly! Interestingly enough the squadron 2IC for MR 21 was a British exchange officer whose background was cavalry and had been an anti-tank troop leader. He described what you just mentioned.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Exactly! Interestingly enough the squadron 2IC for MR 21 was a British exchange officer whose background was cavalry and had been an anti-tank troop leader and had explained exactly what you just mentioned.

And I bet he had a fabulous head of hair, and a limp from sitting too long on a huge wallet

 

[Kirkhill]

It is certainly once piece to the puzzle, the article focussed on a dismounted capability as it is the most glaring omission from the current proposal and sort of the "solution" that the squadron came up with to their problem on MR 21. A dismounted capability is not completely absent, but it proposed by the RCAC as an assault troop held at Regimental level and provided by the reserves. When they will ever have an opportunity to train with the supported Regiment, I am highly dubious, and its supposed to be an assault troop rather than what I envision as being a modern combination previous of support, assault, and pioneer troops (ie, general purpose scouts and able to provide limited mobility support if required).

As I mention thought it's just one piece of resourcing the squadrons to do what they are being asked. Doctrinally you couldn't tell a recce squadron to do much more than SCREEN without significant augmentation by manoeuvre forces - changing the name of the squadron and reorganizing into 4-car troops does nothing to change this.

The other parts of the article are more tangental but should hopefully make clear that organic indirect fires at the sqn level, a more robust anti-armour capability (perhaps even NLOS or loitering munis?), access to mines (both on and off route as tested in the article cited), more robust UAS capability, etc are whats required to have the squadron perform as desired without removing the economy of force element that makes cavalry suitable for reconnaissance, surveillance, screening, etc in the first place (see comments on reconnaissance paradox).

McGrath in "Scouts Out!" would like to see an army that has general purpose manoeuvre forces conducting their own reconnaissance and specialized lighter reconnaissance units disappearing; I think that ignores the reality that resources for the Army is a zero sum game and we cannot afford to have square combat teams doing the job that a real cavalry squadron could.

I agree completely that we had a surplus of bde recce sqns without a bde to employ them, and we should be reforming to something more useful - flicking holy water at them and telling them that they are born again as a tank sqn equivalant is not the answer.

Once upon a time I seem to recall @Infanteer arguing that Recce wasn't an organization. It was, along with ISTAR, a task to which any infantry or armoured unit could be assigned. Perhaps we should now argue to include Special Forces in the mix.

Zulu Impi or Canadian Brigade Group.

The Horns. The Head. The Body. The Body coalesces around the Artillery these days, together with follow on forces.

The Horns and the Head conform to the Two Up One Back advance. with the Horns probing and the Head screening the Body.

Perhaps it is more important to have 4 separate manoeuver elements, 4 separate command structures, that can switch from probe to screen to defend to attack than it is to have 4 specialist organizations.

As to this:

The highlighted part really is (always has been) the key missing piece. The CAF has a tendency to half-ass EVERYTHING rather than focusing on properly and fully investing in key capabilities even if it might potentially mean that other capabilities may suffer.

We tend to blame the government for this, but in reality I think most of the blame goes to the CAF itself. Strong, Secure, Engaged (along with literally every previous defence policy document put out by governments of both federal parties) calls for Canada's military to be:

• Strong at home, its sovereignty well-defended by a Canadian Armed Forces also ready to assist in times of natural disaster, other emergencies, and search and rescue.
• Secure in North America, active in a renewed defence partnership in NORAD and with the United States.
• Engaged in the world, with the Canadian Armed Forces doing its part in Canada's contributions to a more stable, peaceful world, including through peace support operations and peacekeeping.

The first two objectives are very closely related in the capabilities required and due to the huge size of our country those same capabilities are essentially expeditionary in nature and can be used to meet the third requirement.

Military threats to Canada primarily come from the Sea and Air. Detecting those threats is the first priority, so NORAD modernization, Satellites, OPVs, MPA's, UAVs, etc. are required. Then we need to be able to respond to those threats so Fighters, surface combatants, submarines and AD systems are required.

Then we need to be able to respond to any ground and non-kinetic threats, so a rapidly deployable (light) force that can get quickly to any point in Canada is required along with the ability to counter cyber threats and non-conventional threats that are beyond the capabilities of law enforcement to handle.

All of the above require robust logistics capabilities. Lots of air transport. Air-to-Air Refueling. Ships capable of carrying supplies.

Meet those domestic requirements with a properly equipped force and you will automatically be able to fulfill the requirements to be engaged elsewhere in the World. Fighters, naval forces, AAR and transport aircraft, AD systems, Light Rapid Response forces, robust logistics support. I think all of our allies would be quite happy if we could provide those things even if it means we don't have an Armoured Division to add to the mix.

So my take away is that the answer to the Cavalry question, sometimes, is 'Light Infantry', right?

The Royal Irish seem to be now in the business of supplying the Air Assault Brigade a "Patrols" Battalion - A Light Strike Recce Battalion.

So an infantry battalion performing a cavalry function in the same way the airborne Patrols company used to do for the Parachute Battalions.

16 Air Assault Brigade - 4 manoeuvre elements - 2x Abn Infantry (Horns), 1x Air Assault Infantry (Head), 1x Light Strike Recce Bn with 1x Close Support Arty Regiment (Body). Add Pathfinders as Scouts working ahead of the Horns.

 

[MSmith]

Once upon a time I seem to recall @Infanteer arguing that Recce wasn't an organization. It was, along with ISTAR, a task to which any infantry or armoured unit could be assigned. Perhaps we should now argue to include Special Forces in the mix.

Zulu Impi or Canadian Brigade Group.

The Horns. The Head. The Body. The Body coalesces around the Artillery these days, together with follow on forces.

The Horns and the Head conform to the Two Up One Back advance. with the Horns probing and the Head screening the Body.

Perhaps it is more important to have 4 separate manoeuver elements, 4 separate command structures, that can switch from probe to screen to defend to attack than it is to have 4 specialist organizations.

I don't disagree that it is a task that can be assigned to any organization, whether it should be is another question entirely. What are you proposing in a Canadian context within the realm of possibility? The same thing that McGrath is (shift to general purpose manouvre forces and deletion of any recce units/sub-units) as I referred to?

 

[MSmith]

For ease of reference this is what I'm referring to:

 

[daftandbarmy]

Once upon a time I seem to recall @Infanteer arguing that Recce wasn't an organization. It was, along with ISTAR, a task to which any infantry or armoured unit could be assigned. Perhaps we should now argue to include Special Forces in the mix.

Zulu Impi or Canadian Brigade Group.

The Horns. The Head. The Body. The Body coalesces around the Artillery these days, together with follow on forces.

The Horns and the Head conform to the Two Up One Back advance. with the Horns probing and the Head screening the Body.

Perhaps it is more important to have 4 separate manoeuver elements, 4 separate command structures, that can switch from probe to screen to defend to attack than it is to have 4 specialist organizations.

As to this:





The Royal Irish seem to be now in the business of supplying the Air Assault Brigade a "Patrols" Battalion - A Light Strike Recce Battalion.

So an infantry battalion performing a cavalry function in the same way the airborne Patrols company used to do for the Parachute Battalions.

16 Air Assault Brigade - 4 manoeuvre elements - 2x Abn Infantry (Horns), 1x Air Assault Infantry (Head), 1x Light Strike Recce Bn with 1x Close Support Arty Regiment (Body). Add Pathfinders as Scouts working ahead of the Horns.

View attachment 72252

One key difference:

'Global Response Force' = Fighting (dismounted mainly) against 3rd world rebel forces from a position of huge overmatch with over-watch from national air and other assets.

There is no way an Airborne formation like 16 X could, on their own and without armoured vehicles, take on an armoured recce role on the battlefield.

 

[Kirkhill]

I don't disagree that it is a task that can be assigned to any organization, whether it should be is another question entirely. What are you proposing in a Canadian context within the realm of possibility? The same thing that McGrath is (shift to general purpose manouvre forces and deletion of any recce units/sub-units) as I referred to?

I think so.

The means of travel may be more important than the packet of sensors and weapons. Given the quality of and quantity of manportable systems is is fair to ask how much can be done with manportable systems transported on foot, by truck, atv, LAV, helo, boat or air before resorting to heavier systems that absolutely must be carried by wheels and tracks?

 

[Kirkhill]

One key difference:

'Global Response Force' = Fighting (dismounted mainly) against 3rd world rebel forces from a position of huge overmatch with over-watch from national air and other assets.

There is no way an Airborne formation like 16 X could, on their own and without armoured vehicles, take on an armoured recce role on the battlefield.

But surely the AT tactics you described above are not dissimilar to those use by the Ukrainians outside Kiev? If you can stand off 4 km from a tank and take pot shots at it with your Javelin can't you still contribute effectively to the Armoured Battle?

 

[MSmith]

I think so.

The means of travel may be more important than the packet of sensors and weapons. Given the quality of and quantity of manportable systems is is fair to ask how much can be done with manportable systems transported on foot, by truck, atv, LAV, helo, boat or air before resorting to heavier systems that absolutely must be carried by wheels and tracks?

I'm not sure that you read the article I posted then, one of the key issues that the squadron faced was how to cope with the tempo of a heavy mechanized enemy advance while still doing what the commander asked. The sum of parts (sensors, weapons, combination of dismounted and mounted means of transportation) is the only way that they could figure out how to pull it off?

It does no good to run away faster than the enemy advances unless you have been told only to SCREEN. Being overrun and hiding is no good either.

 

[daftandbarmy]

But surely the AT tactics you described above are not dissimilar to those use by the Ukrainians outside Kiev? If you can stand off 4 km from a tank and take pot shots at it with your Javelin can't you still contribute effectively to the Armoured Battle?

If you are part of an armoured formation of some kind then yes.

Otherwise, you can't move fast and protected, with heavy and long range covering fire, and become road pizza/ track fodder.

And I have seen Paratroopers in Scimitars. We're OK, but nowhere near as good as the pros!

 

[FJAG]

I found your article interesting especially from the point of view that we seem to be experimenting with possible solutions in an ad hoc manner. It interests me in that we continue to rely on the ingenuity and "make it work" attitude of our soldiers and junior officers rather than any deliberate process of purposeful analysis. TAPV itself appears to have been a knee jerk reaction to one situation without a proper overarching analysis of what is truly needed over the entire spectrum of combat that the CAF might be committed to.

The cavalry "experiment" reminds me a lot of the artillery's struggle in the '00s to "stay relevant". The armoured corps had the same struggle in the Army's rush to divest all the heavy kit.

As a former, Cold War gunner I can't speak for the specifics of modern kit currently in use (my era encompassed Ferrets and Lynx and ran into the Cougar) so my observations are by necessity general.

@MSmith's observations are bang on. Whoever thought giant barndoors like the LAV and TAPV would work as recce/cavalry vehicles in most terrain was highly optimistic. The low signature of a dismounted team is highly desirable and the potential weapons systems they should have make them highly lethal to pretty much as far out as they can typically see. Their problem is mobility and vulnerability to artillery. (lets face it nothing that will ever deploy with cavalry will be invulnerable to a hit from a tank or ATGM). If you can't change position quickly and shake of the splinters raining down on you, you're toast. Transportation of additional (fairly large) rounds of ATGMs is also needed. You can't always rely on falling back on prepositioned caches in a fluid fight.

Helicopters are pretty much a non starter in the environment we are contemplating now - entirely too vulnerable. Reaching way back in history motorcycles with sidecars were used to effect by the Germans. ATVs are the modern equivalent. Both lack armour and thus entail some risk. While Ferrets did mount SS-11 ATGMs, they are too limited on crew size and Lynx and Cougar go back to the size issue. I liked the CVR(T) family although I thought they were still a bit largish. When it comes to modern existing vehicles, I'm more into the world of the French VBL or the German Wiesel family of vehicles as to size and protection as adequate - not great - but adequate as I think that the key to cavalry in the European environment is 1) don't be seen in the first place, 2) once unmasked, change position rapidly while reasonably protected from small arms and artillery fire while moving, and 3) have enough ammo on board (supplemented by caches) to fight another engagement. Being small and able to hide the vehicle and fight dismounted greatly assists 1). Being small, fast and lightly armoured helps 2) and being just large enough to carry some spare rounds (externally if necessary) helps 3). Anything else becomes a compromise.

I'm not sure if the cavalry should include light infantry or whether the skill set of the cavalryman should simply incorporate light infantry skills as part of their basic trade craft. I tend to go to the latter as mixing the two trades simply sounds like both the infantry and armoured corps looking for ways to "stay relevant". If we had a larger army it wouldn't even be an issue - cavalry would be its own trade/classification.

Besides the vehicles and crews themselves comes the enablers.

In my days as an FOO we rotated around. During the screen or guard some of us would be in DS to them. Once we passed lines our affiliation changed to predesignated battalions and OPs in the main defence and some were prepared to revert to the tanks if a counterattack phase was called for. All that reshuffling is not optimal. Current FOO/JTACs have the LAV OPV which is yet again a barn door when deployed forward. I've quickly come to the conclusion that if the recce force is to become cavalry with its more robust mandate then it needs a dedicated FSCC and dedicated FOOs/JTACs equipped with vehicles that match those of the cavalry and still have the technology required for effective indirect fire support.

I'm a fan of mortars and UCAVs. The two systems have different effects - mortars more anti-personnelish and UCAVs more anti-materielish. I can't see why a mortar platoon can't do both as they systems are generally needed at different stages of a fight. UCAVs as the enemy approaches, mortars once they shake out and dismount. It just requires a C&C system and vehicles and weapons to easily go either way. IMHO, every battalion and the cavalry element (whether a squadron or regiment) should have an organic mortar/UCAV platoon supplemented by the heavier systems of the artillery which should also have a heavier, longer range UCAV capability.

I'll leave air defence. It's a necessity but we're in such poor shape that it just becomes navel gazing. Suffice it to say that bot anti-UAV and manpad systems should be part and parcel to the cavalry whether organic or as an attachment is immaterial at the moment.

Pioneers? Engineers? Again not too sure to what extent engineer capabilities should be organic to the cavalry or be attached from the brigade's engineer elements. It's absolutely clear that engineering support is needed at certain. The real question is whether that's a temporary use needed solely when the positions are prepared or whether its an ongoing need. If the former than attached for the time needed; if the latter than organic and equipped with vehicles that match the mission. My gut tells me its temporal and therefore ought to be an engineer attachment while needed and then withdrawn for other tasks.

As to the new paradigm - all that I can say is "Jack of all trades, master of none."

Anyway - my $0.02.

 

[Kirkhill]

I'm not sure that you read the article I posted then, one of the key issues that the squadron faced was how to cope with the tempo of a heavy mechanized enemy advance while still doing what the commander asked. The sum of parts (sensors, weapons, combination of dismounted and mounted means of transportation) is the only way that they could figure out how to pull it off?

It does no good to run away faster than the enemy advances unless you have been told only to SCREEN. Being overrun and hiding is no good either.

There lies the rub, the squadron was ordered to accomplish a task that it was simply not organized, equipped, nor augmented for

Isn't that the heart and soul of the problem? The field commander was tasked by higher to do something that higher had no business asking. Sometimes its appropriate to say "We can't do that, sir." Although it may be better to wait until the initial estimate has been done and it becomes clear what resources are lacking.

Also, for clarification, when I said that the means of transport may be more important than the package of weapons and sensors I was suggesting that the key skill sets differentiating the cavalry and the infantry is the ability to manoeuvre effectively in vehicles.

My sense is that in Canada both the RCAC and the RCIC have both become Dragoons, in the old sense of mounted infantry that rides into position but fights on foot. This situation has arisen because there is vanishingly little difference between the means of transport of the two elements. And their suite of weapons and sensors are similar. The net effect, IMO, seems to be that both elements are converging on the same styles of warfighting, the same sets of capabilities.

The tendency for both arms to adopt vehicles that are increasingly taller, and heavier, forces both to use the terrain in similar manners.

If you are part of an armoured formation of some kind then yes.

Otherwise, you can't move fast and protected, with heavy and long range covering fire, and become road pizza/ track fodder.

And I have seen Paratroopers in Scimitars. We're OK, but nowhere near as good as the pros!

And I would agree. I would assume - and I should have been explicit - that 16 AAB or any of the Light Brigades of 1 UK Div or the Royals would expect to have the Heavy Brigades of 3 UK Div following on. The situation would be similar to that of 1 Abn in Tunisia.

While on the subject I note that 3 UK only has two Armoured Brigades to work with its Deep Strike Brigade. Adding 16 AAB or an emplaced 1 UK light brigade would result in a manoeuvre force of 4 formations with the first formation on the ground in 72 hours and, in Northern Europe, the rest of the Division to follow on in 7 to 14 days? Although based on historical precedent the Airborne may want to allow the Armour a month to arrive if they promise to be there in a week.

Edit - sorry for the attachment. That is a bit of a non-sequitur. It presupposes an argument that I decided against. It is the 1944-45 British Canadian Armoured Div construct. File for future reference if you like.

 

[Kirkhill]

I found your article interesting especially from the point of view that we seem to be experimenting with possible solutions in an ad hoc manner. It interests me in that we continue to rely on the ingenuity and "make it work" attitude of our soldiers and junior officers rather than any deliberate process of purposeful analysis. TAPV itself appears to have been a knee jerk reaction to one situation without a proper overarching analysis of what is truly needed over the entire spectrum of combat that the CAF might be committed to.

The cavalry "experiment" reminds me a lot of the artillery's struggle in the '00s to "stay relevant". The armoured corps had the same struggle in the Army's rush to divest all the heavy kit.

As a former, Cold War gunner I can't speak for the specifics of modern kit currently in use (my era encompassed Ferrets and Lynx and ran into the Cougar) so my observations are by necessity general.

@MSmith's observations are bang on. Whoever thought giant barndoors like the LAV and TAPV would work as recce/cavalry vehicles in most terrain was highly optimistic. The low signature of a dismounted team is highly desirable and the potential weapons systems they should have make them highly lethal to pretty much as far out as they can typically see. Their problem is mobility and vulnerability to artillery. (lets face it nothing that will ever deploy with cavalry will be invulnerable to a hit from a tank or ATGM). If you can't change position quickly and shake of the splinters raining down on you, you're toast. Transportation of additional (fairly large) rounds of ATGMs is also needed. You can't always rely on falling back on prepositioned caches in a fluid fight.

Helicopters are pretty much a non starter in the environment we are contemplating now - entirely too vulnerable. Reaching way back in history motorcycles with sidecars were used to effect by the Germans. ATVs are the modern equivalent. Both lack armour and thus entail some risk. While Ferrets did mount SS-11 ATGMs, they are too limited on crew size and Lynx and Cougar go back to the size issue. I liked the CVR(T) family although I thought they were still a bit largish. When it comes to modern existing vehicles, I'm more into the world of the French VBL or the German Wiesel family of vehicles as to size and protection as adequate - not great - but adequate as I think that the key to cavalry in the European environment is 1) don't be seen in the first place, 2) once unmasked, change position rapidly while reasonably protected from small arms and artillery fire while moving, and 3) have enough ammo on board (supplemented by caches) to fight another engagement. Being small and able to hide the vehicle and fight dismounted greatly assists 1). Being small, fast and lightly armoured helps 2) and being just large enough to carry some spare rounds (externally if necessary) helps 3). Anything else becomes a compromise.

I'm not sure if the cavalry should include light infantry or whether the skill set of the cavalryman should simply incorporate light infantry skills as part of their basic trade craft. I tend to go to the latter as mixing the two trades simply sounds like both the infantry and armoured corps looking for ways to "stay relevant". If we had a larger army it wouldn't even be an issue - cavalry would be its own trade/classification.

Besides the vehicles and crews themselves comes the enablers.

In my days as an FOO we rotated around. During the screen or guard some of us would be in DS to them. Once we passed lines our affiliation changed to predesignated battalions and OPs in the main defence and some were prepared to revert to the tanks if a counterattack phase was called for. All that reshuffling is not optimal. Current FOO/JTACs have the LAV OPV which is yet again a barn door when deployed forward. I've quickly come to the conclusion that if the recce force is to become cavalry with its more robust mandate then it needs a dedicated FSCC and dedicated FOOs/JTACs equipped with vehicles that match those of the cavalry and still have the technology required for effective indirect fire support.

I'm a fan of mortars and UCAVs. The two systems have different effects - mortars more anti-personnelish and UCAVs more anti-materielish. I can't see why a mortar platoon can't do both as they systems are generally needed at different stages of a fight. UCAVs as the enemy approaches, mortars once they shake out and dismount. It just requires a C&C system and vehicles and weapons to easily go either way. IMHO, every battalion and the cavalry element (whether a squadron or regiment) should have an organic mortar/UCAV platoon supplemented by the heavier systems of the artillery which should also have a heavier, longer range UCAV capability.

I'll leave air defence. It's a necessity but we're in such poor shape that it just becomes navel gazing. Suffice it to say that bot anti-UAV and manpad systems should be part and parcel to the cavalry whether organic or as an attachment is immaterial at the moment.

Pioneers? Engineers? Again not too sure to what extent engineer capabilities should be organic to the cavalry or be attached from the brigade's engineer elements. It's absolutely clear that engineering support is needed at certain. The real question is whether that's a temporary use needed solely when the positions are prepared or whether its an ongoing need. If the former than attached for the time needed; if the latter than organic and equipped with vehicles that match the mission. My gut tells me its temporal and therefore ought to be an engineer attachment while needed and then withdrawn for other tasks.

As to the new paradigm - all that I can say is "Jack of all trades, master of none."

Anyway - my $0.02.

I'm not sure if the cavalry should include light infantry or whether the skill set of the cavalryman should simply incorporate light infantry skills as part of their basic trade craft

In keeping with the discussion about general purpose manoeuvre units I would offer this compromise -

A cavalry unit - 3 cavalry sub-units and 1 infantry sub-unit.
An infantry unit - 3 infantry sub-units and 1 cavalry sub-unit.

The unit would get assigned to the task depending on terrain and the balance of probabilities. The vehicle the cavalry sub-units adopted would depend entirely on how they got into theater, the terrain they would encounter and the likely capabilities of the enemy.

And the logisticians should be challenged. Small fleets are worth the extra effort and expense.

 

[GR66]

It seems to me that the first article you recommended as a "primer" (First Principles and the Generation of Armoured Fighting Power) is somewhat at odds with what you end up proposing.

The "First Principles" article states quite adamantly in multiple places that combat experience has shown that "reconnaissance is simply a tactical task inherent to all combat units", not something for which a specialist unit should be assigned.

As close reconnaissance is the responsibility of every fighting unit, and mounted formation reconnaissance has almost exclusively been conducted by fighting units in times of conflict, reconnaissance is simply one tactical task among many, and the sense function is in fact an inherent part of all tactical activities (and an established and important step in all battle procedure), be it an advance to contact, a patrol, or an attack. As such, the labelling of an organization as reconnaissance does not eliminate the continued need for mutually supporting manoeuvre. Except for specialist close reconnaissance combat support, such as the regimental or battalion reconnaissance troop or platoon (which is explicitly not a manoeuvre element nor a fire-unit), there is no greater need for a reconnaissance-specific manoeuvre organization than there is for an attack-specific manoeuvre organization, as multi-purpose combat forces are by their very nature equipped and trained for the full range of tactical activities within the spectrum of operations.

Subsequently, furtive reconnaissance (information by stealth) is largely the domain of dismounted forces, while aggressive reconnaissance (fighting for information) is largely the domain of mounted forces. It is also important to note here that not only should these “two roles not be confused,” but that wartime lessons learned were additionally adamant that “it was inadvisable to combine mounted and dismounted roles,” as one would naturally detract from the other: for example, mounting infantry would “seriously reduce… the number of ‘bayonets on the ground,’” a point which remains entirely relevant today. These facts point to some of the reasons why, throughout history, armoured reconnaissance has been conducted almost exclusively by mounted multi-purpose combat forces

Despite what officially constitutes the armoured occupation and how it operates, including the hard-fought doctrinal lessons underpinning it, a counter-productive division has slowly crept in, with an inadvertent and arbitrary demarcation between tank (a type of equipment), and reconnaissance (a type of tactical activity). This effectively divides the trade into combat and combat support streams. This is counter-productive in the same way as the arbitrary division of the infantry trade into a machine gun (equipment) and a reconnaissance (activity) stream would be

Although the armoured regiment maintains a reconnaissance squadron by policy, as noted, the replacement of the fourth armoured squadron with a “’56 Recce”-type squadron has never actually been incorporated into armoured doctrine. Current armoured doctrine instead correctly continues to mandate four armoured (combat or sabre) squadrons per regiment,89 an organization that is firmly based on solid doctrinal principles—what the British Army refers to as the “principle of four.” Canadian Army brigade doctrine continues to proscribe the maintenance of a divisional reconnaissance unit (manoeuvre arm) which can detach squadrons to one or more of its brigades as necessary. However, since the closing of the First Canadian Division at the end of the Cold War, along with the First Canadian Division Armoured Reconnaissance Regiment, doctrinal formation reconnaissance in the form of the divisional armoured regiment has ceased to exist due to resource constraints. In the armoured context, this latter point has been a source of much confusion as each regiment, as a matter of policy, was already maintaining a reconnaissance squadron based on the 56th Reconnaissance Squadron model for the purposes of peacekeeping operations. However, an armoured reconnaissance squadron is nothing like this squadron. For example, the 29th Canadian Armoured Reconnaissance Regiment had exactly the same configuration of Sherman tanks as any other armoured regiment, with armoured reconnaissance squadrons consisting of four troops of four tanks each.

For example, United States Army doctrine notes that the “M1A2 [Abrams tank] is especially valuable in the mounted [observation post]” role and is well suited for route, area and zone reconnaissance, in addition to conducting screen lines and patrols. The British Army echoes this, stating that the Challenger II tank provides an excellent surveillance platform, and outlines its use in mounted observation posts, convoy escort, vehicle control points, reconnaissance, and patrolling. This is reinforced by Canadian experiences with Leopard tanks conducting reconnaissance, framework patrolling and other security tasks, such as vehicle checkpoints and cordons in Kosovo in 1999, as well as tanks employed in surveillance tasks and light armoured vehicles in the assault in Afghanistan. So, reconnaissance, security and surveillance are tasks to be assigned to various organizations based on a variety of factors such as risk, open or complex terrain and the need for aggressiveness versus stealth, to name just a few, and do not represent organizations in and of themselves.

Some countries have divided their armoured forces into separate unit types, however, largely based on equipment weights and capabilities with a corollary natural focus on different points along the spectrum of conflict. For example, the United States and the United Kingdom maintain explicit labels for combat organizations that, while still able to conduct “offensive, defensive, security, and peace keeping and support operations,” have a non-exclusive focus on reconnaissance and security tasks. For instance, the British “Light Cavalry” and the United States “Cavalry Scout,” focus on one or more of the three doctrinal lineages of armour and have been separated into different types of fighting units (although still a single manoeuvre arm). However, having multiple types of combat units focused on different areas along the spectrum of operations is likely unsustainable in tightly constrained resource environments.

Smaller armies such as Canada’s and Australia’s have a single type of armour common regiment within the Corps (the armoured regiment), and even the British Army, during the tightly constrained Second World War and post-war environments, did away with its tank and armoured cavalry units in favour of the common armoured regiment. Given the highly constrained resource environment within the Canadian Army, particularly an acute shortage of operational armoured combat vehicles (i.e. modern tanks of any weight), restoration of three different weights of armoured regiments within the Royal Canadian Armoured Corps is neither feasible nor desirable.

At the same time we must also acknowledge the fact that all British armoured units, whether light, medium or heavy, do not operate using the same Ground Manoeuvre Reconnaissance (combat support) construct as Canada. Therefore, even though the British maintain three different weights of armoured unit, it must be remembered that the fundamental role and tactical doctrine of all three are the same.

A study conducted following the Second World War on British and Canadian mounted reconnaissance (armoured car) units “concluded that, on average, they had been engaged on mounted reconnaissance for only two percent of the time spent in contact with the enemy in Italy, the figure rising to nine percent in north-west Europe,” and more specifically in the case of the 1st Armoured Car Regiment (Royal Canadian Dragoons), “no more than five percent of operational time had been spent in mounted ‘reconnaissance.’”

Subsequent American experiences during the Korean War led to the conclusion that “information of the enemy, his strength and dispositions, has not been gained by reconnaissance patrols using stealth and observation as commonly contemplated by accepted doctrine,” but instead “friendly armor was employed in direct support of infantry attacks, on reconnaissance and patrol missions, and as tank-infantry task forces which penetrated into enemy held areas to seek out his dispositions and cause maximum casualties.” Germany’s experiences were clearly articulated in its post-war publications. “[A]lthough reconnaissance is accomplished in various ways… in the final analysis, however, it must be carried out by the combat unit.” A “misleading conception was widespread until the end of the war that reconnaissance did not really belong to the tasks within the tank company [armoured squadron]…. Combat experience, of course, soon forced a rethinking.” Colonel Wolfgang Schneider of the German Army, who literally wrote the book on German panzer tactics, states that “the vital mission of reconnaissance—whether area, zone or route… is generally the mission of the tank platoon [armoured troop].” These observations have been borne out by multiple other studies as well. For example, one analysis conducted by the United States Army Combat Studies Institute concludes that ... the nature of reconnaissance has changed since the days of the horse from a specialized function done by units with unique capabilities to merely one of several functions any combat unit is expected to be able to accomplish. The retention of units designed and organized to perform such missions no longer reflects operational realities.... In all recent US Army conventional operations, the most common type of action was movement [advance] to contact, a type of operation in which the lead unit, whether cavalry [reconnaissance] or not, was effectively the reconnaissance element. Similarly in nonconventional operations such as counterinsurgency, where there are no actual front lines, all combat (and even most combat support and some combat service support units) units become de facto reconnaissance units by the nature of the conflict.

 

[MSmith]

It seems to me that the first article you recommended as a "primer" (First Principles and the Generation of Armoured Fighting Power) is somewhat at odds with what you end up proposing.

The "First Principles" article states quite adamantly in multiple places that combat experience has shown that "reconnaissance is simply a tactical task inherent to all combat units", not something for which a specialist unit should be assigned.

Correct- I wrote this in response to the ideas in that article and the cavalry concept generally (the article is a good summary of what the RCAC is currently pushing).

To be clear: I agree that we had too many bde reconnaissance sqns. I do not agree with rebranding them as cavalry without allocating more capability to them. I do not agree with the cavalry concept as currently articulated by the RCAC, especially the "principle of four" and the notion of being platform agnostic.

Originally this all started as a doctrine cleanup in circa 2014-2015 but has sinced morphed into something far larger than it should have. My article was trying to show that if we see this through as the RCAC envisions, the consequences will be fairly dire when someone orders a "cavalry" squadron equipped with TAPVs and LAVs to do something like DELAY or GUARD or COVER against heavy mech forces.

GMR was very clear not to do this unless reinforced by tanks at best or DFS at worst. I tried to go a step further and say that the addition of dismounts (due to the "battlefield density" and observability of vehicles) among a few other capabilities, is what would be needed to make this workable in the way that I think the corps envisions.

Again, the point of the article is to put all this theory in the context of a squadron actually applying this against real, thinking people with good capabilities of their own. The OPFOR wanted to be successful and had MUAS, indirect fire, etc as well.