Author Topic: The Manouvre Officer: Combining MOCs 21 and 23  (Read 53156 times)

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Yard Ape

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The Manouvre Officer: Combining MOCs 21 and 23
« on: July 22, 2004, 00:09:36 »
The Infantry officer & the Armoured officer share a common Phase II, share the ATOC, and both go through the Combat Team Commanders course.  The Infantry officer will learn to fight the LAV III, while the Armoured officer will learn to fight the Coyote (though both have the same turret).  Both MOCs are responsible for leading the fight.  A lot of things are happening in our small army that may make it feasable (and possibly benificial) to combine the two into a single MOC.  For years Infantry officers have lead such diverce capabilities as recce and anti-armour.  They have proven capable of working mounted & dismounted.

In the Armoured world, our tanks are being removed from service.  In thier place we will get fewer LAV III mobile gun systems.  This will effectivly give us an assult gun to use in a fire base, but will likely be a poor cavalry vehicle.  The cavalry fighting will now be done in dedicated LAV III or in the Coyote (both vehicles that the infantry have a history with).

I propose a career progression where a Lt would still lead a rifle platoon, and a junior Capt would still lead a Sr platoon.  However, senior platoons would now include any in a Recce Sqn or an MGS Pl (and the traditional TOW Pl & Recce Pl).

This change would apply to regular force only (not reserve of special force) and only to officers.  Infantry NCMs would continue to exist to win the dismounted fight &  Cavalry NCMs would continue to exist to win the mounted fight.

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Re: The Manouvre Officer: Combining MOCs 21 and 23
« Reply #1 on: July 22, 2004, 15:26:15 »
Wouldn't you have to get rid of the regimental sysetm then?  Your idea does show promise though.
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Yard Ape

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Re: The Manouvre Officer: Combining MOCs 21 and 23
« Reply #2 on: July 23, 2004, 00:46:39 »
No.  I would see regiments becoming non-homogenous though.  Infantry & Armoured regiments would be a thing of the past.  Instead, regiments would be a mix of both armour & infantry NCMs under manouvre officers.

Offline Chris Pook

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Re: The Manouvre Officer: Combining MOCs 21 and 23
« Reply #3 on: July 23, 2004, 01:00:36 »
Quote
No.  I would see regiments becoming non-homogenous though.  Infantry & Armoured regiments would be a thing of the past.  Instead, regiments would be a mix of both armour & infantry NCMs under manouvre officers.

Excellent idea.  Just to confirm the idea - Regimental Battlegroups?  Would you include gunners, engineers etc in your regiments?
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Yard Ape

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Re: The Manouvre Officer: Combining MOCs 21 and 23
« Reply #4 on: July 23, 2004, 01:08:03 »
I would not include gunners or engineers because they must retain the ability to function at the brigade level (I don't have the close minded view that we will only ever deploy a battle group).  The battalions I picture would be striclty manouvre arms and an Admin Coy.

Offline Lance Wiebe

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Re: The Manouvre Officer: Combining MOCs 21 and 23
« Reply #5 on: July 23, 2004, 07:06:59 »
There are certainly going to be some major changes coming soon.

Canada, I believe, is going to follow the New Zealand example, and merge the two Corps (armour and Infantry).  The rationale is that Armour, without tanks, is replicating jobs already carried out by the Infantry, as you point out.

As the first part of this merger, the Armour has taken on the crew responsibilities of the LAVIII, freeing up the Infantry for dismounted ops.  The theory is, after the Infantry dismount, the Armour have the experience to continue to conduct mounted operations over and beyond providing direct fire support.  Eventually, the plan is to teach select Infantry Officers mounted ops, and to completely take over.  In the near term, the Infantry Battalions have been bolstered by the addition of the Armoured Corps providing all of the drivers, gunners, and crew commanders for all of their vehicles.

New Zealands reasoning is remarkably similar to ours, tanks are expensive, they will never go on operations alone, and Australia or the US will provide the required armour, and so on.

I fear that Armour, as we know it, will disappear from the Canadian Forces fairly soon.  Before we celebrate the centennial of the first appearance of the tank in WW1, for sure.  Will the Armour Regiments follow, or can they find another role?  Based on the bilateral visits by several high ranking officers between Canada and New Zealand, it is my feeling that some units will be gone for sure.

Canada will have the benefits of learning from the New Zealand experience.  There was a few hiccups that New Zealand has found.  For example, Infantry Company Commanders wanted to both command the vehicle and the fight, which is reasonable.  But then, where does the former Armour Squadron commander fit in?  What happens if the Infantry Major dismounts?

Some major changes are going to happen, and soon, I am very sure.  The all-wheel decision is forcing the hand of the powers that be.
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Offline Chris Pook

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Re: The Manouvre Officer: Combining MOCs 21 and 23
« Reply #6 on: July 23, 2004, 11:39:36 »
Quote
(I don't have the close minded view that we will only ever deploy a battle group). 


OUCH!! That hurt mummy!!  ;D
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AndrewWGrieve

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Re: The Manouvre Officer: Combining MOCs 21 and 23
« Reply #7 on: July 24, 2004, 20:34:06 »
Read the latest Canadian Army Journal and it has two articles on amalgamation and "The new Regimental system."

Yard Ape

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Re: The Manouvre Officer: Combining MOCs 21 and 23
« Reply #8 on: August 13, 2004, 02:13:44 »
Read the latest Canadian Army Journal and it has two articles on amalgamation and "The new Regimental system."
and what is your opinion on a manouvre officer MOC?

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Re: The Manouvre Officer: Combining MOCs 21 and 23
« Reply #9 on: August 13, 2004, 03:00:55 »
Good idea Yard Ape.  I would suggest a second alternative, splitting the Infantry and the Mechanized Infantry.

The Infantry will remain a separate corps, specializing on Light Infantry doctrine.  It will become the experts at air assaults, airborne missions, mountain warfare, jungle warfare, amphibious operations, and providing support to SOC units (both ours and our allies) and other roles demanding highly trained, flexible light fighters who are capable of operating in any location.  With the new Light Infantry Battalion TO&E in the works, this new direction for the branch will form doctrine around the excellence displayed by the soldiers of the PPCLI while on combat operations with the Americans in Afghanistan.

The mechanized infantry will be combined with the Armoured Reconnaissance and the Armoured (if Canada decides to maintain the capability in any form) branches to form the new Maneuver Branch (call it whatever you want, I've previously advocated Cavalry for historic reasons).  This equally important branch fills a different important facet of armed conflict; the decisive delivery of shock and firepower to any situation which requires it.  The Maneuver Officer will deal with all the aspects of fighting in this manner; his light recce forces, his DFS or Armour(?) support and his Cavalry Dismounts (Mech Inf) to support the vehicles.  As you brought up in your proposal, the maneuver aspects of Mechanized Infantry and Armoured are so intertwined that the doctrine should be mutually supporting and the training one and the same, requiring a single Maneuver Officer to become the master of this form of fighting.
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Yard Ape

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Re: The Manouvre Officer: Combining MOCs 21 and 23
« Reply #10 on: August 13, 2004, 03:20:11 »
I would not split the Infantry NCM into two MOCs.  Parachute, helicopter, and APC are just means of getting to the fight.  But once the infanteer is dismounted and in the fight, his job is the same regardless of how he got there.  We could look at an organizational change that puts all light forces in the same formation, and makes the remaining formations fully mechanized (and I think we have talked on this in another thread).

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Re: The Manouvre Officer: Combining MOCs 21 and 23
« Reply #11 on: August 13, 2004, 04:24:16 »
Quote
Parachute, helicopter, and APC are just means of getting to the fight.  But once the infanteer is dismounted and in the fight, his job is the same regardless of how he got there.

True.  The line of thought behind this idea is that while light infantry will deploy from a Jeep, a helicopter, a Herc, or by walking up the mountain, the fact remains that they fight light and that they fight as infantrymen.

I see the Mech/Armour combination as a different organism altogether.  The Dismount (Mech Infantry) does not simply use its vehicle as a means of getting to the fight, it actually fights with its vehicle.  The dismount section must learn to operate as one with the vehicle.  This coexistence is even more pronounced with the movement from a simple battlefield taxi (M113) to the Infantry Fighting Vehicle (LAVIII, Warrior, etc) that fights with its dismounts.  Captain O'Leary comments on this in his paper "21st Century Infantry Company" found here: http://regimentalrogue.tripod.com/papers/21st.htm.

Sure, a dismounted Infantry fighting from his LAVIII and a light infantry soldier fighting in the mountains of Afghanistan are "in the fight, and have the same job regardless of how he got there", the nature of the role of Mechanized forces fighting with its vehicles as opposed to Infantry operating independently within unique terrain demands and force requirements justify the existence of two separate branches.  They may use the same tactics (fire-and-movement, section attacks) but these are formula's on how to fight that are not the monopoly of any one branch, Engineers can and will operate as Infanteers when they fulfill the Assault Pioneer role, while Artillery Soldiers must learn Infantry tactics in the event that their gun position comes under assault.  Heck, even the CS and CSS trades should know how to fight and win through teamwork.  Therefore, I contend that although the same role can be performed by Light Infantry and Cavalry Dismounts (Mech Inf) I would think that each role has a fundamentally different "style" to it and thus a branch split between the two is feasible and desirable.

Do you see the approach I've taken to my line of thought?
"Overall it appears that much of the apparent complexity of modern war stems in practice from the self-imposed complexity of modern HQs" LCol J.P. Storr

Yard Ape

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Re: The Manouvre Officer: Combining MOCs 21 and 23
« Reply #12 on: August 13, 2004, 04:28:50 »
Infantry must always be able to work in all arms groupings regardless of if it is mech or light.  If Cavalry Crewmen fight the LAV, what additional skills do the Infantry in the back need?

kosstro

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Re: The Manouvre Officer: Combining MOCs 21 and 23
« Reply #13 on: August 15, 2004, 00:51:40 »
HI, I currently am MOC 21 (I go to RMC) and am in the process of trying to switch to MOC 23, therefore, this entire discussion is basically about my future, so i have a few things i would like to add that perhaps you are unaware of:

1.Becoming a qualified infantry or qualified armour officer is very, very hard, and trying to become both would be extremely difficult.  There are 4 phases to become an officer, first Basic(IAP and BOTP), then CAP(common army phase) then two trades courses.(Phase 3 and 4).  Last year, as i am informed by older Cadets here, the failure rate of Phase 3 for infantry was over 75%(donèt quote me, but it was something like 53 on course, 17 finished, 9 actually passed) Phase 3 for armoured was around 60-65%.  All ièm saying here is that you need to be very, very good to be this so-called manouvre officer, as you need the leadership and intelligence to pass these courses, as well as the raw physical endurance to pass the infantry, and the multitasking required to command a tank troop(Think crew, troop, squadron, all of which you have to function as a member of)
Soooo, you will end up with either very few, albeit extremely competent manouvre officers, or you will need to lower training standards, therefore lowering competence.

2.  I think combining the two trades would eliminate doubling up of jobs, but i think this generalization of ourselves would lead to a loss in skills from both sides of the spectrum: perhaps infantry, more focused on being ferried around would gradually lose some light infantry skills.  I think INFANTEERs idea of a separate light infantry is very necessary, but this doesnèt solve the problem of lost skills on the armour side:  With more of a focus on ferrying around infantry, and fighting to support them, would we lose the abilities of the armour to fight on their own, using their firepower and mobility, like in the good old daysÉ

Overall, the idea of combining the two trades makes sense on paper, but the implementation would be nightmarish: combining two trades that each take a career to master seems like a bit of tall order to me, deciding on what training, what equipment, the units(having two different trades of ncms in one unit sounds a bit fishy to me, how are you supposed to get unit cohesion when you have one permanent unit with two separate entities)
Anyway, besides my two cents, what i really wanted to bring up was that looking down the road it seems to be enough of a challenge for me to try to competently run an infantry platoon or an armour troop, let alone some heavily mechanized abomination of the two, but its sounds like this is going to happen anyway, so wish me luck...

What do you think about thisÉ

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Re: The Manouvre Officer: Combining MOCs 21 and 23
« Reply #14 on: August 16, 2004, 05:18:17 »
Yard Ape,

I've taken a little time to go over our conversation.   I still think a split between the Light and Mech Infantry may be a better option.

Quote
Infantry must always be able to work in all arms groupings regardless of if it is mech or light.   If Cavalry Crewmen fight the LAV, what additional skills do the Infantry in the back need?

For the Mech side of the house I was sort of envisioning a shift towards building off the concept of the American Cav Scout (19D) who works along side the Armoured Crewmen (19K) in mechanized ops.

http://www.goarmy.com/JobDetail.do?id=39

Of course, the mechanized Infantry will be expected to be more then scouts, as they will fight along side the vehicles to support the armour in poor terrain and set up fighting positions with the Armour on the defence.

The Infantry branch will focus on the light roles.   I've seen it explained that the new doctrine will make the Light Infantry Battalions capable of providing support to SOC units.   In its own branch, this will become one of the foundations for how the new Infantry Corps builds its doctrine.   Although it shares the same basic groundwork as the Mech Inf, the two train to fight two distinct "styles" of war; one the hard hitting and mobile battle of the armoured forces the other the light, flexible and elusive battle of the light infantry.   Lennox Lewis and Oscar de la Hoya may both be boxers, but each one has to train and approach their fighting style differently due to the distinctions between the classes they represent.

I was recently going over some old articles and I found an excerpt from our very own Captain O'Leary (found at his site here http://regimentalrogue.tripod.com/papers/sect_atk.htm) that does a good job in summing up the distinction:

"The eight-man section is based on the size of a dismounted section of mechanized infantry, leaving a driver and a gunner out of a ten-man section in the section vehicle. That eight-man section is, therefore, the basic dismounted manoeuvre unit of the mechanized rifle platoon, but there are some inherent requirements for its survivability. Principally, it expects to be delivered between and to its objectives under armour. Also, it expects to have that vehicle carry its extra ammunition and other combat supplies, and, doctrinally, it expects that vehicle to be available to supplement its firepower with machine-gun or cannon fire. And in a mechanized role, it is very easy to imagine that the primary task of infantry is to execute short intense assaults from a dismount area in close proximity to an objective. The section, it is presumed, would always be an element of the larger tactical unit and the section commander would have limited tactical options or associated requirements for training. That's why mechanized infantry sections can be smaller and have limited tactical options. But, it's also why light infantry sections should be larger and should be trained in tactics that minimize the impact of the absence of the mechanized unit's vehicle-based logistical capability and fire support."

Mechanized Infantry, working in tandem with the armoured forces (of which its very own LAV III belongs to) can be merged together so that a single unified doctrine can ensure the maximum cohesion between different aspects of the Combat Team.   The Light Infantry requires its own doctrine in order to ensure that it can formulate the best method of winning battles on difficult terrain with the main stay of it's support carried in.

I should say this now, this isn't an argument for "elitism"; an attempt to split the "sexy" light side of the Infantry equation away from its mounted brethren (and give them a different colour beret in the process, one of the silly ideas of seen before).   Right now, the lightfighter is en vogue due to the recent popularity of movies and books dealing with the US Army Ranger Regiment and other SOC units.  
As a modern war such as Iraq as shown, both the light units that deployed into Northern Iraq to support the Kurdish forces and the mech/armoured thrusts that blitzed into Baghdad and up to Tikrit both fought commendably to win the ground war in Iraq.   Both types of forces were required for victory and bore their share of the conflict through use of the unique capabilities.   What I am proposing is to acknowledge this split and form our organizations and doctrine around two separate forms of defeating the enemy.

Does this seem a little more plausible now?   Looking forward to comments.

Infanteer
"Overall it appears that much of the apparent complexity of modern war stems in practice from the self-imposed complexity of modern HQs" LCol J.P. Storr

Offline Chris Pook

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Re: The Manouvre Officer: Combining MOCs 21 and 23
« Reply #15 on: August 16, 2004, 12:28:02 »
Well argued Infanteer.  For what its worth I agree with you.

One other aspect that may be worth considering is that one of the reasons the Stryker Brigades were introduced was to resolve an ongoing "debate" (to put the kindest spin on it) between the "Light Fighters" and the Armored types in the US Army.

As you say, although the "Light Fighters" are currently "en vogue" it was only 9/11 that changed that.  For years the Light Infantry in the States has been rundown and considered to be second class citizens, "too light to fight" and a waste of resources that could otherwise have been spent on real war fighting.

The Strykers were an attempt - successful - to get the "Light Infantry" and armoured bus that could deliver them close to the front-line where they could get out and become infanteers.

Armor in the US successfully co-opted the Bradley, which started life as method of allowing the infantry to keep up with the tanks and went through an up-arming process which reduced the amount of troops and armour that could be carried.  This forced the section to be reduced in size, which resulted in a requirement for new tactics which eventually resulted in the guys in the back being withdrawn from the infantry training cycle and transferred to the armor - on the grounds that the Infantry guys couldn't fight a high-speed war, they were stuck in "4 miles per hour mode".

I believe the Americans got it right with their armour forces.  But they screwed up royally on the infantry side, too much specialization and just not enough numbers.

The Brits have got a better force balance but apparently can't afford all the new toys - maybe they can if they fix procurement but that seems to be beyond the ability of all nations just now.

I believe that your dividing the Canadian Force between Light Infantry and Mech Infantry/Armour/Cavalry is rational. 

I have argued elsewhere on this board for two different types of force - a Garrison and a Manoeuvre force.

The Light Force or Garrison Force (as opposed to Light Raiders like the Airborne) needs a firm base, either temporary or permanent, from which to sustain operations.  Such a base needs to be defended.  As such it represents a source of stability and a statement of intention to the locals in the area. 

The Manoeuvre Force is necessary for the High Intensity War but also necessary in Garrison environments to keep the "Enemy" off balance.  But it too needs a firm base out of which to operate.  The Garrison force would supply this.

I agree with you.  Let the Infantry handle the light fight - complex terrain and static defence (with engineering support) - even the dreaded "constabulary" or "peace-support" duties.

Transfer the Mech Infantry or Dragoons as the Americans appropriately call them, be  to a sub-trade of the Armoured or Cavalry Corps and let them focus on support the Manoeuvre battle.
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Yard Ape

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Re: The Manouvre Officer: Combining MOCs 21 and 23
« Reply #16 on: August 18, 2004, 09:37:39 »
Infanteer,

If I follow you would like to see a Mechanized Officer MOC and a Light Infantry Officer MOC.  You would also see a Mechanized Infanteer MOC, a Light Infanteer MOC, and a Cavalry Crewman MOC.   Is that right?

I believe the Americans got it right with their armour forces.  But they screwed up royally on the infantry side, too much specialization and just not enough numbers.
By splitting light infantry & mech infantry into unique MOCs, would we not be doing the same to ourselves?

Mechanized Infantry, working in tandem with the armoured forces (of which its very own LAV III belongs to) can be merged together so that a single unified doctrine can ensure the maximum cohesion between different aspects of the Combat Team.  The Light Infantry requires its own doctrine in order to ensure that it can formulate the best method of winning battles on difficult terrain with the main stay of it's support carried in.
All this can be accomplished by forming dedicated all-arms light & mech units (or even formations) without any need for splitting the MOC.  It also confuses the fact that light infantry must still be able to fight in an all arms setting along side cavalry, and that mech infantry must be able to fight in complex terrain. 

I've seen it explained that the new doctrine will make the Light Infantry Battalions capable of providing support to SOC units.  In its own branch, this will become one of the foundations for how the new Infantry Corps builds its doctrine.  Although it shares the same basic groundwork as the Mech Inf, the two train to fight two distinct "styles" of war; one the hard hitting and mobile battle of the armoured forces the other the light, flexible and elusive battle of the light infantry.
Again, all of this achieved by how the units are organized & trained.  The basic skill sets required of the infantry in both situations is basically the same.

Quote from: kosstro

Becoming a qualified infantry or qualified armour officer is very, very hard, and trying to become both would be extremely difficult.  There are 4 phases to become an officer, first Basic(IAP and BOTP), then CAP(common army phase) then two trades courses.(Phase 3 and 4).
I am aware of the officer phase training.  The first two phases are the same for both infantry and armour (in fact all army officers take the same courses to complete the first two phases).  Phase 3 for Armd is Crew Commander, and phase 3 for infantry is dismounted Pl Comd.  Phase 4 for Armd is Tp Comd and phase 4 for infantry is Mech Pl Comd (which includes Crew Commander).  After phase 4, the two MOCs are again on a common training plan (AOC, ATOC, & CTCC).  Other officer MOCs take 4 months (or possibly more) to fully train their officers.  By going to an 8 month phase 4, the manoeuvre officer could achieve the same competency.

I believe we should stick with the Infanteer MOC and Cavalryman MOC that we have now, but merge the Armd Officer & Infantry Officer MOC into one.


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Re: The Manouvre Officer: Combining MOCs 21 and 23
« Reply #17 on: August 18, 2004, 10:07:51 »
I see the points behind your criticisms, Yard Ape.

I am currently reading through Col Douglas MacGregor's Transformation Under Fire (his second book on organizational reform).  Interesting enough, he echos the recommendation that Major Donald Vandergriff makes in his The Path to Victory in that the branches of the Combat Arms (Infantry, Armour, Artillery, Engineer, and Army Air Corps) into one single branch named "Combined Arms".  I'm still reading his ideas, so I'll explain it a little more in a future post.

Pretty radical notion, I have a feeling that the paracholism of the Combat Arms branches would lead to oppositon against such a proposal.  Perhaps it has merit though?

More to follow.
"Overall it appears that much of the apparent complexity of modern war stems in practice from the self-imposed complexity of modern HQs" LCol J.P. Storr

Yard Ape

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Re: The Manouvre Officer: Combining MOCs 21 and 23
« Reply #18 on: August 18, 2004, 10:11:44 »
I cannot see grouping more than the manouvre MOCs into one branch.  The other Combat Arms being too technical.

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Re: The Manouvre Officer: Combining MOCs 21 and 23
« Reply #19 on: August 18, 2004, 10:14:59 »
I agree with you there, Yard Ape.  However, I'm still interested in seeing the organizational advantages to the proposal, if they are beyond merely cosmetic (ie: 1 branch with 4 or 5 "arms" means just adding another layer of command).
"Overall it appears that much of the apparent complexity of modern war stems in practice from the self-imposed complexity of modern HQs" LCol J.P. Storr

Offline Lance Wiebe

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Re: The Manouvre Officer: Combining MOCs 21 and 23
« Reply #20 on: August 18, 2004, 12:25:38 »
Yes, I would be interested in reading your summary of his thoughts as well.

The only thing I can see him getting at is a basic infantry type training for all, then a breakdown in specialties.  But, that, basically is what we have now.

I'll wait for your post.........my head hurts.
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Offline Chris Pook

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Re: The Manouvre Officer: Combining MOCs 21 and 23
« Reply #21 on: August 18, 2004, 13:58:05 »
From YardApe

Quote

Quote from: Kirkhill on August 16, 2004, 12:28:02
I believe the Americans got it right with their armour forces.  But they screwed up royally on the infantry side, too much specialization and just not enough numbers.
By splitting light infantry & mech infantry into unique MOCs, would we not be doing the same to ourselves?


I think what I was trying to get at was that in a 10 division army they fielded 6 Armored Divisions that carried about 4-6000 rifles with them, all designed to support the Tank.  No problem with that.  As I said I believed they had the Manoeuvre side sussed.

The problem was with the Infantry, Rangers, Airborne, Air Assault and a couple of light divisions and separate brigades trying to justify their existence.  No commonality of role, structure, training, equipment -- anything.

Shinseki's Medium Brigades (actually light brigades with wheeled transport to repel bullets) and the current chaps infantry centric units of action are attempts to clean up the infantry side.

I think we are (or maybe were is a better statement) not to bad on the infantry side.

We used to have 36 commonly trained infantry companies that could transition from light to M113s relatively easily.   We are now down to 27 companies, 3 airborne, 6 light and 18 dragoons.  The LAVIII has imposed a different style of fighting.  Something different to light or light/M113 and yet not quite Bradley/Warrior.

My suggestion is that our current 27 companies be reallocated as follows, 3 airborne, 3 dragoons and 18 light.

The dragoon companies would be enough to supply riders to a brigade (or Unit of Action) of Cavalry mounted in LAVIIIs.  One US battalion of Mech Inf only has about 180 rifles in it (Bolger, Death Ground: Today's American Infantry in Battle) and a Unit of Action (Armored) comprises a Tank Battalion, an Infantry Battalion (3 coys) a Cavalry Squadron (US) and an arty Battalion (2 Btys).

Interesting Link to 3rd Inf Div web site.  3ID has been re-orged to the new structure
http://www.stewart.army.mil/Display.asp?Page=519F0559-BB39-492A-BF6D-7AAF2FBE0CE7

The other 18 companies (possibly the airborne too) would all be trained to common standards and be largely interchangeable.  While they would be familiar with the LAVIII and may have them assigned to their Battalion/Battle Group as a support Squadron/Coy they would train primarily on their feet.

The dragoons by contrast would train solely for mounted manoeuvre warfare.

Before anyone says can you keep skills alive with 3 coys (540 PYs or so) Assault Troops never counted more than 200 PYs , Pioneers, Anti-Armour and Mortars about 360 PYs apiece and none of them concentrated in one place.

I guess it is just which syLLABle you choose to emPHASize.

Cheers. :)
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Offline MCG

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Re: The Manouvre Officer: Combining MOCs 21 and 23
« Reply #22 on: November 21, 2004, 04:41:37 »
Ape,
Looks like you have a little more support.
I see one Officer MOC: Close Combat Officer. His training would be be grounded in Infantry initially, but just as the Inf officer has traditionally done, he would master suffiicient understanding of how to use all the combat systems in the branch. Note that I do not say 'use of the other Arms" because they would no longer exist as separate arms. Instead, a Close Combat unit would be like a tool box: we would train officers to select and employ the right tools to get the required effect. The "nuts and bolts" knowledge would be in the hands of the WO grades and NCOs.(If you are interested, see my letter in the latest issue of the Canadian Army Journal, in which I laid this concept out). Cheers.

Offline pbi

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Re: The Manouvre Officer: Combining MOCs 21 and 23
« Reply #23 on: November 21, 2004, 06:19:44 »
I do not see that the Artillery has any grounds on which to escape the merger. Artillery fire control is becoming less complex, not more, as it is increasingly digitized. For at least 50 years we have trained Infantry Officers as mortar platoon commanders and Inf NCOs as MFCs: it is a question of skill sets and training, coupled with advances in technology, not of the dire need to have a separate branch to shoot big bombs at things the shooters can't see.   Infantry is already doing this, up to 120mm mor.

If the argument is that we need Artillery officers in order to plot and control WWII-legacy "Div Shoots"   I suggest that idea   is also OBE. I doubt we will engage in such activities again, and if we ever do, I suspect it will be by the digital coordination of fires observed by UAVs, striking with more precision from fewer systems, rather than flattening a grid square with hot steel. Nothing that cannot be taught to any officer who has mastered a Mortar Platoon CP operation, with modern   fire control equipment. Further, I think that to separate fire effects from manouevre, at the level we are likely to function at, is a mistake. The two are intimately connected and in fact "fires" should really be extended to "effects" to take in the full range of lethal, non-lethal and electronic systems we may employ on different types of ops.

Apart from the "specialist" skills of the C2 element of the Artillery branch(mainly officers but with a few NCOs), the jobs performed by the great majority of the soldiers are IMHO of a limited mechanical nature that could easily be taught to infantrymen (or to anybody else, for that matter).

We are so married to the rice bowls we have now that I fear we cannot envision anything different. Unless the Armour or Artillery are going to be equipped in a manner that they bring a "value added" that only they can do, and could not be performed by a more flexibly employable soldier MOC in the Close Combat Branch, then I see no reason to keep them as separate, stand-alone entities in an Army as small and lightly equipped as ours. Cheers.




« Last Edit: November 21, 2004, 06:22:18 by pbi »
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Offline Lance Wiebe

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Re: The Manouvre Officer: Combining MOCs 21 and 23
« Reply #24 on: November 21, 2004, 07:13:15 »
Interesting point, PBI.

Just too add to your argument, at one time Armour Officers and NCO's were taught how to use their tanks as artillery.  We conducted indirect fire shoots, controlled by a forward observer.

If the Armour could do it, it obviously is not rocket science!

This skill set has been dropped from Armour training, not because of complexity, but because of ammunition costs.
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