Total Members: 73,471|
Total Posts: 1,462,257
Total Topics: 71,996
Total Categories: 13
Total Boards: 124
Top of the evening Mike or staff
I just tried subscribing via e-transfer and it failed on me via the alternate to PayPal option.
If you want to confirm who or where I can send it to, I will do so shortly. Been here to long not to pitch in.
P.s reason for the post is I see two different e transfer addresses and the alternate subscribe page failed so wanted to be sure that the addresses were up to date before I sent.
| Write Comment
The Cbt Tm in Ops pam is being reviewed. The fact that our Pams are no longer printed means that they can be reviewed and updated more frequently. I've been asked to have a look at the pub and give my comments. A couple thoughts have already been put forward such as making Cbt Tm in Ops an annex to BG in Ops which means much of the repetition between the books could be eliminated and it could focus on things like TTPs. There will also be a "Degraded Ops" chapter which will account for things like EW, and maybe CBRN and operating without air superiority.
How should our doctrine be nested between books? We have Land Ops as our capstone doctrine then we have a Bde (basically a word for word copy of the British one), BG, and Cbt Tm publication. It seems to me that there is some repetition between them. What stays and what goes between different Pams and where should the emphasis be at each level? As an example, should the fundamentals be discussed again specifically how they can be applied at the Cbt Tm level, or should they just be listed like an aide memoir?
What do you guys like about our doctine and what don't you like? What needs to be in Cbt Tm Ops that isn't?
Some initial thoughts:
The defence portion needs to be fleshed out more and made less conceptual
It requires a chapter on direct fire control
The seven step KZ development drill must be enshrined in it
TTPs or templates for forms of maneuver other than frontal and flanking need to be discussed, such as how do we bypass (infiltrate)?
TTPs or templates for operations other than hasty attacks, such as defensive occupation, withdrawal, link up, etc. The British standard orders cards are an interesting example of these.
An emphasis on being able to execute battle procedure rapidly
A better discussion on where to dismount
Put Reserve Demo Guard back in
Time estimates for Off, Def, and enabling ops
Staff data to support things like time estimates
Guidance on how to integrate sub sub units from different nations
A more explicit discussion on the roles and responsibilities of the Coy 2IC, SSM, Coy CQ and Tpt Sgt in the A1 and A2 echelons
A discussion on the factors that drive the composition of the echelons, particularly ammo storage.
Remove some of the more technical artillery pieces
Revise the Merry Up Checklist to include a few other items such as mission specific rehearsals
Formations, their adv and disadv
| Write Comment
I was lucky enough to spend the last 10 days in the UK and France on a staff ride of the Western Front from WW 1 with the British Army. The Brits have done a similar ride every two years for the last six years and have been using it for force development purposes so it's less about the history of a specific battle and more about what we could draw from that battle that is relevant to future operations.
While I gained a ton of lessons, one point that kept coming out was the importance of some of the principles and particularly surprise. Our discussions led us to believe, unsurprisingly, that surprise would continue to be important to successful offensive actions in the future. Considering the proliferation of cheap UAVs and many of our potential enemy's focus on EW, not to mention all the less novel surveillance and reconnaissance assets out there, achieving surprise seems to be becoming more difficult.
This led discussions to the importance in the future of opsec and deception. Opsec presents challenges on multiple levels for the Canadian Forces. Most of us, particularly our younger soldiers are used to broadcasting their lives on social media. Our headquarters are huge and blast the EM spectrum making them light up like a Christmas tree. More concerning is the impact opsec could have on mission command. In WW 1 Hague imposed heavy opsec on his formations with those being aware of future operations being kept to a very small number of people. We now want informed commanders and soldiers who are empowered to make decisions independently. Could we severely restrict information on future operations without damaging our command culture (or what we think is our command culture)?
I don't think we do deception very well. Most commanders in the CA will have few opportunities to do what I call high fidelity training (essentially force on force of at least Ex MR quality) where you are fighting a thinking enemy who you could actually deceive as opposed to a place holder enemy controlled by the DS or exercise staff. We noted that deception needs to be resourced and credible. It is ideally targetted at making the enemy to make a decision that is inappropriate for your chosen course of action. The more resources dedicated the more credible it will likely be. A deception plan that sees you dropping some smoke to the enemy's left when you're coming right is less likely to work than a deception plan that put an actual sub unit there. Deception will be most effective when you have a good understanding of the enemy's culture/biases and their commander specifically. This can allow you to get in their head and show them what they want or expect to see. An instructor told me once the best lie is a half truth.
Resources for deception are always a problem, paradoxically, the fewer resources you have compared to your enemy the more you need to rely on deception. Our sr mentor compared this to a bar fight. If I'm going to pick a fight with a guy twice my size the more I need to rely on distracting him before striking.
I had a discussion with my CO a few weeks back and if we don't think we can successfully hide then perhaps the answer now is to flood the enemy with signatures. Essentially this would be numerous decoys of maneuver forces, headquarters, logistic sites, and anything else that might get the enemy to juke when he should jive and provide us with increased force protection.
Just a few musings after a particularly good professional development experience.
| Write Comment
The first time I started watching this video I paused it and looked for other videos because I thought it was fake.
It's pretty incredible. Imagine what kind of options a commander would have if he had 100 soldiers who could strap this jet board to their feet and move 25 kilometers in 10 minutes, flying Nap-of-the-earth or possibly above eye sight. Maybe fly 10kms behind enemy lines, do some damage and fly back out.
It has a max speed of 93MPH and can fly for up to a predicted 30 minutes with the pilot wearing a backpack full of jet fuel. Operational ceiling is 10'000 feet without O2.
Promotional cool video:https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-kB-BGMXxZc
Info video/early flight https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VAit7ZtetrA
| Write Comment
This is a random hypothetical that has crossed my mind:
Would the CAF (or any Military really) be more or less effective had it adopted a "unified/singular" rank structure along the lines of the RCMP, or most any police force, and why?
Why have Militaries historically separated their non-commissioned and commissioned rank structure into distinct career paths, while police forces produce their Commissioned Officers by promoting their Staff Sergeants to Senior Commissioned Officer ranks such as Inspector, and therefore do not have Junior Commissioned Officers?
On the surface at least it would seem to be a good thing that the Commissioned Officers "know the job" and started at the very bottom.
Thanks in advance for the insight folks
| Write Comment
Found on Facebook by Mark Bossi
Radio Silence – A Lesson in Mission Commandhttps://wavellroom.com/2017/12/14/radio-silence-a-lesson-in-mission-command/
Contributor: Will has 6 years of hands on infantry leadership experience
While practising radio silence on a recent exercise I realised just how reliant I had become on technology. It had made me lazy and more controlling than I would like to admit.
In Eastern Europe 2014 a column of Mechanised and Air Mobile forces from the Ukrainian Army was struck by a devastating rocket bombardment lasting only 3 minutes. The result was over 100 casualties and many vehicles destroyed. It initially seemed as if the column had been targeted with Electronic Warfare (EW) assets; a sensor that detects radio transmissions and sends the location back to the rocket battery for targeting. This is a worrying prospect for any military commander; that enemy artillery could home in on a radio transmission. This development leads us to adapt and overcome. An easy way to combat enemy EW capabilities would be to impose radio silence; an exercise often talked about, but rarely actually done. Up to now in my career I had never exercised radio silence and I found the concept of not being able to communicate with my subordinates during a task uncomfortable. So, on a recent exercise we gave the enemy forces EW and an artillery capability, forcing us to impose radio silence. What I learned was much more than how to combat EW and the technicalities of imposing radio silence, but a lesson in leadership, mission command and empowerment.
The first mission, anti-armour ambush, I briefed as I usually would with a clear intent and key timings, but also imposed radio silence. Overall the action went well and the task was performed to the same standard as it would be using radios throughout. However, the ambush was sprung on a lone enemy vehicle moving along the track. The team understood the intent: destroy enemy armour, and acted. However, a larger column came through later untouched. With radios, I would have said: ‘hold fire,’ on the lone vehicle. More detail in my brief covering all eventualities would have prevented this. Here I discovered that radios had made me lazy in my briefing because I knew I could control it well during the action.
So, for the next exercise I made sure I considered all eventualities and briefed the commanders applying more timings and constraints where necessary. When can you break radio silence? What should you do if you lose comms? What should you do if you get cut off? And if all else fails, destroy all enemy tanks and meet back at the rendezvous No Later Than 0230hrs. This time I witnessed several changes in the unit. I saw junior commanders making decisions, good decisions, without any direction from me. One of the teams missed their pick up and rather than speak on the radio trying to rearrange it they carried out their task on foot successfully. Other teams encountered difficulties during the mission but they knew the intent and end state and were able to complete their tasks without further direction for 36hrs of radio silence.
Overall it was a liberating exercise. It showed me that my subordinates are incredibly intelligent, capable soldiers who, when empowered, given a clear intent and detailed set of constraints can be released on task and will carry it out to a high standard without further direction. All I needed to do was trust them. It was also a relief for them not hearing me over the radio always asking for an update. Radio silence is the ultimate exercise in mission command and is tactically relevant. Try asking yourself: Am I enquiring because I need to or because I can?
| Write Comment
The last invasion of Britain; the French at Fishguard
Battle of Ogdensburg
Private Osborne of the Northamptonshire Regiment, won the Victoria Cross during an action in the First Boer War, when he rescued a wounded man under very heavy fire.
British troops succeeded in capturing a number of Turkish trenches at Sanna-i-Yat in Mesopotamia. The Turks launched a vigorous counter-attack, and managed to retake part of the position. However, Sergeant Steele of the Seaforth Highlanders, assisted by another soldier, managed to position a machine-gun in an advantageous spot. Steele then manned the gun and for several hours was able to frustrate Turkish attempts to exploit their success. When finally another Turkish attack did break through, Steele managed to rally the British troops, and led them in a successful counter-attack of their own, during which he suffered a severe wound. His gallantry and leadership was recognised by the award of the Victoria Cross.
Harris appointed Commander in Chief, RAF Bomber Command
HMCS Weyburn sunk by U-118
HMCS Trentonian sunk by U-1004
» Download the iPhone/iPad Military History app! «